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A PROPOSAL TO STRENGTHEN THE RIGHT OF
RESPONSE TO NEGATIVE CAMPAIGN
COMMERCIALS
Michael Kimmel
In the 1996 elections, the candidates, their political parties, and outside
interest groups spent several hundred million dollars on election-related
television and radio commercials! Approximately half of these commer-
cials were negative ads that attacked a candidate's character or putative
position Election analysts predict that spending for election ads, in-
cluding negative ads, will increase significantly in the 1999-2000 election
cycle.' Meanwhile, reformers have proposed a variety of campaign fi-
nance changes that will lessen the impact of money on the political proc-
ess. Commentators and lawmakers have given less consideration to spe-
cific problems posed by negative campaign ads.
I. THE DILEMMA OF NEGATIVE CAMPAIGN COMMERCIALS
There is some tension between the postulated and practical rationales
for using negative ads. Some political analysts have defended negative
Michael Kimmel is a member of the District of Columbia Bar and a former appellate
counsel with the United States Department of Justice.
1. See ELIZABETH DREW, WHATEVER IT TAKES: THE REAL STRUGGLE FOR
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 253 (1997) (estimating that outside groups spent about
$50 to $75 million on "issue ads"); Carroll J. Doherty, Inquiry on Campaign Finance:
Burning With a Short Fuse, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 767, 768 (Apr. 5, 1997) (stating that
the Federal Election Commission reported that the 1995-96 federal campaigners spent
over $2 billion); Fed. Election Comm'n, Press Release, FEC Reports Major Increase In
Party Activity for 1995-96 (Mar. 19, 1997) (stating that Democratic and Republican party
committees spent about $270 million in party "soft money" receipts and partially used this
money for "issue ads"), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/ptyyel.htm; Television Bu-
reau of Adver., Inc., Press Release, Broadcast Television Political Ad Volume Hit Record
High of $400 Million In 1996 (Jan. 22, 1997) (reporting that political advertising reached
an all-time high of $400 million for express election ads) (on file with the Catholic Univer-
sity Law Review).
2. See DARRELL M. WEST, AIR WARS: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN ELECTION
CAMPAIGNS, 1952-1996 58-61 (2d ed. 1997); see also STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE &
SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: HOW ATTACK ADS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE
ELECTORATE 90 (1995).
3. See Stuart Elliott, The Media Business: Advertising, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1999, at
C6.
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ads as an important means of informing voters about issues. Campaign
consultants recommend their use, however, mainly as a way of decreas-
ing voter support for targeted candidates Consequently, negative cam-
paign ads are subject to abuse and can have serious adverse conse-
quences, including the following:6
(a) they can be misleading, deceptive, or inaccurate;
(b) they are frequently designed, with help of modern advertising
techniques and imagery, to disparage a candidate's reputation and integ-
rity, and to weaken voters' trust of targeted candidates, rather than fairly
addressing campaign issues;
(c) they can cause a vicious cycle of ad hominem attacks;
(d) they require the amassing of large "war chests" and constant fund-
raising efforts by candidates and parties;
(e) they give well-financed candidates and interest groups a large me-
dia advantage against lesser-financed candidates;
(f) they have more impact on the public than other ads, and televi-
sion's wide reach makes these negative ads hard to counter;
(g) their threatened use can inhibit politicians from addressing difficult
but needed policy choices; and,
(h) they create political cynicism and alienation in the electorate, and
can easily suppress voter turnout.
These factors suggest that unremitting negative campaigns are at odds
with the public interest, to the extent they create an unfair and unin-
formative electioneering process, suppress voter turnout, and inhibit po-
litical discourse and comity.
Many politicians share this view,7 though in some cases with regard to
4. See KAREN S. JOHNSON-CARTEE & GARY A. COPELAND, NEGATIVE
POLITICAL ADVERTISING: COMING OF AGE 278-81 (1991); William G. Mayer, In Defense
of Negative Campaigning, 111 POL. SCI. Q. 437, 441 (1996).
5. See LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC: RESHAPING
DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 230 (1995); ED ROLLINS WITH TOM DEFRANK,
BARE KNUCKLES AND BACK ROOMS: MY LIFE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 350-51 (1996);
LARRY J. SABATO, THE RISE OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS: NEW WAYS OF WINNING
ELECTIONS 16, 165-66 (1981).
6. See ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 2, at 90, 112-14, 147-49;
GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 230; JOHNSON-CARTEE & COPELAND, supra note 4, at
276-78; MONTAGUE KERN, 30-SECOND POLITICS: POLITICAL ADVERTISING IN THE
EIGHTIES 185, 208-12 (1989); SABATO, supra note 5, at 324-26; James A. Albert, The
Remedies Available to Candidates Who are Defamed by Television or Radio Commercials
of Opponents, 11 VT. L. REV. 33, 37-41 (1986).
7. See 143 CONG. REC. H1345 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1997) (statement of Rep. Tiahrt)
(arguing that voters cannot make good decisions if the information on TV is false and
misleading); 143 CONG. REC. S2509-10 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Cle-
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an opponent's or outsider's ads rather than their own. In the past, con-
gressional legislators have introduced proposals addressing negative ads.
8Some have called for free response time at public or media expense.
These proposals have not become law. Current, more general reform
proposals, which call for public financing of campaigns, or require free
airtime for candidates, do not distinguish between negative and positive
election ads.9
This Article describes a reform proposal that will reduce the adverse
effects of negative ads and will protect the integrity of the electoral proc-
ess by strengthening a candidate's right to respond to these ads. After
describing the main features of the suggested reform and relevant First
Amendment decisions of the Supreme Court, this Article sets forth the
reasons that the proposed reform is consistent with the First Amendment
and is sound policy.
II. STRENGTHENING THE RIGHT OF RESPONSE
In brief, the proposed reform would grant candidates targeted in nega-
tive television or radio ads the opportunity of a contemporaneous equal
time response, which would air immediately after the negative ad. Un-
less the candidate himself speaks about an opponent in a negative ad, the
sponsor of the negative ad would be required to share the media cost of a
response ad. The proposed remedies would apply only to ads aired three
months or less before the election.
For purposes of the proposal, a negative ad is "a paid advertisement
spoken on television or radio, three months or less prior to an election,
that opposes a clearly identified candidate." Sponsors subject to the rule
include any person or entity paying for a negative ad, including candi-
dates, campaign committees, political parties, or outside interest groups.
The proposed reform would apply to campaign season commercials
that "oppose" clearly identified candidates, for example, by referring ad-
versely to a particular candidate's character, qualifications, public record,
land); 143 CONG. REC. S2481 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1997) (statement of Sen. Durbin); 143
CONG. REC. E392 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1997) (statement of Rep. Christensen); 143 CONG.
REC. S808 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1997) (statement of Sen. Bumpers) (introducing The Public
Confidence in Campaigns Act of 1997).
8. See S. 3, 102d Cong. (1991); 137 CONG. REC. 12,358-59 (1991); S. REP. No.
102-37, at 18, 50 (1991) (public subsidy to respond to independent ads); 137 CONG. REC.
12,358-59 (1991); 131 CONG. REC. 33,612-13 (1985) (statement of Sen. Boren) (introduc-
ing proposal for free airtime for responses to negative ads).
9. See S. 229, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 25, 105th Cong. (1997); 143 CONG. REC. S808
(daily ed. Jan. 29, 1997) (publishing text of Public Confidence in Campaigns bill); 143
CONG. REC. S659, (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997) (statement of Sen. McCain) (proposing free
airtime in initial McCain-Feingold bill for candidates who accept spending limits).
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or position on an issue. Such ads would trigger the targeted candidate's
right of response, regardless whether the ad includes special words such
as "vote against" or "defeat."
The essential elements of the proposal include shared cost and con-
temporaneous opportunity for targeted candidates to respond to nega-
tive ads. These elements require particular explanation.
A. Shared Cost
When negative ads are aired in typical election campaigns, targeted
candidates either ignore the ad, run unrelated and unresponsive negative
ads against the sponsoring candidate, or respond directly to the charge
made in the negative ad. Direct responses are the most useful for voters,
as such responses tend to elucidate contentions and issues raised in a
campaign.
Broadcast advertising time, including response time, is expensive. The
question is whether the cost of media time to respond to negative ad
charges should continue to be borne entirely by the targeted candidate or
should be shared by the negative ad's sponsor. This proposal calls for
sharing response time cost. The primary justification is to ameliorate the
substantial financial advantage that wealthy sponsors now deploy in mass
media negative campaigning against targeted candidates. Excessive and
repetitive use of negative ads by wealthy candidates, political parties, and
outside interest groups can result in a targeted candidate's defeat solely
because of financial disparity in purchasing media time.'° Dividing the
cost of response time between negative ad sponsors and targeted candi-
dates will significantly reduce this unfair advantage.
The shared response time cost requirement has the related benefit of
providing an incentive for targeted candidates to address the merits of
negative ad charges. This promotes a responsive and informative debate
in election advertising instead of unrelated attacks and counter-attacks,
or inability to finance a response.
The net result of response time cost sharing should be more balanced
airing of campaign issues and less domination of campaign advertising by
sponsors amassing the most money. Response time cost sharing may also
remove some existing disincentives against consideration of legislation
that is opposed by special interests inclined to use negative ads to attack
10. See Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 432, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(quoting Sen. Mathias); ANSOLABEHERE, supra note 2, at 69-70, 116 (possible effect of
negative ads on election outcomes); KERN, supra note 6, at 185; WEST, supra note 2, at 30-
31,190-91.
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supporters. Cost sharing will place these persons in a more viable posi-
tion to support legislation they believe is needed, and to defend their po-
sitions at election time.
In contrast to political parties and organized interest groups, many
candidates, particularly those with modest campaign funds, cannot rea-
sonably and invariably share response time costs when they sponsor
commercials criticizing their opponents. The proposal resolves this mat-
ter through an exception allowing candidates to air their own spoken ads
that criticize opponents without incurring response time costs. This ex-
ception protects candidates who have limited funds. Furthermore, by
creating an incentive for candidates to speak directly, rather than using
narrators, the exception may result in greater attention to accuracy.
One potential objection to any shared cost requirement is that this re-
quirement may "chill" outside interest groups' right to air such ads.
Without denigrating this concern, the objection, as a general proposition,
is speculative in nature. The typical interest group sponsor appears to be
wealthy enough to afford to pay for the media cost of the negative ad as
well as part of the media cost of response time. Of course, a sponsor who
knows that a negative ad misrepresents the facts or raises immaterial
matters will probably not air such an ad if having to share response time
costs makes the ad more costly than effective.
It might also be objected that not all outside sponsors of negative ads
are equally wealthy, and, indeed, some may have less cash than the can-
didates they attack. The financial position of a candidate who may be at-
tacked by many outside interest groups, some now and some yet to come,
and who must use campaign funds for affirmative advertising and ex-
penses as well as responding to negative ads, cannot, however, realisti-
cally be balanced against the financial position of any one outside inter-
est group. More relevant is the fact that many candidates are financially
unable to respond to all negative ads against them; that the outside spon-
sor of a negative ad suffers no risk in their use, but the targeted candi-
date does; and that the candidate's response is just as important as the
negative ad. Moreover, most negative ads are repeatedly aired many
times. Cost considerations might limit the number of times the same ad
is aired, but would not prevent the message from being aired.
Considering that mass media advertising requires abundant financial
resources, the "poor sponsor" point is a theoretical rather than practical
objection. Television and radio negative campaigning is not a pursuit of
the average American citizen. This type of campaign is the business of
candidates, political parties, and well-organized and well-funded interest
groups. Cost sharing seeks to remedy the practical problem of deploy-
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ment of organized wealth by these political entities, in repetitive and fre-
quently unfair and misleading negative campaigning.
Prior campaign reform proposals have called for public or media sub-
sidy of response time for negative ads sponsored by outside interest
groups.1' The need for some subsidy is apparent when a candidate, faced
with disproportionate televised attacks by interest groups or the other
political party, must respond, but cannot because of "disparity based on
wealth."'2 The negative ad sponsor is the entity that imposes the need to
respond on the targeted candidate. For this reason, some subsidy for re-
sponse time seems more appropriately an equitable obligation of the
negative ad sponsor than of the public or media, if the question is who
should provide it.
If a sponsor is wealthy enough to finance a mass media negative elec-
tion campaign, parsimony or immunity regarding response time cost
sharing is neither a fundamental interest, nor an equitable one. Negative
ad sponsors do not have a right to drown out the voices of candidates
they oppose by the sheer dominance of their wealth. Sharing the media
cost of response time should be seen as a fair and civil adjunct of the cost
of mounting a negative campaign on the nation's mass media-our na-
tional and popular "town hall." Sharing that forum is the price owed for
public and civilized debate of election campaign issues.
In sum, with specified limitations, requiring negative ad sponsors to
partially assume response time costs for targeted candidates is a reason-
able and necessary measure to remedy unfair campaign advantage in the
electoral process. It will also promote informative public debate of issues
raised in negative ads. Whether cost sharing, if constitutional, should be
50-50, or some other reasonable proportion, would be a matter of legisla-
tive discretion.
B. Contemporaneous Response
The proposal to strengthen the right of response to negative ads also
requires that targeted candidates have the opportunity for equal and con-
temporaneous response time. This aspect of the reform has two main
11. See supra note 8 (listing prior campaign reform proposals). If Congress should
require public or media subsidy, there would be no need to consider a subsidy by negative
ad sponsors.
12. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause bars excessive candidate filing fees). Statutes that require equal broadcast oppor-
tunities for candidates and grant candidates the lowest unit charge for election advertising,
see 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)-(b) (1994), do not resolve this wealth disparity if opponents or out-
siders choose to outspend a candidate in the number of ads aired, especially if these ads
are negative.
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purposes. First, a contemporaneous response reduces prejudice to tar-
geted candidates resulting from widespread public airing of misleading or
inaccurate charges. Second, the public would have a realistic opportunity
to hear and assess both the negative ad and the response.
The alternative is a delayed response that will often be missed by lis-
teners who heard the original negative ad. A contemporaneous response
is much more effective than a delayed response in protecting legitimate
reputational interests and in exposing voters to both sides of a campaign
issue.
13
Campaign season negative ads are aired in order to defeat targeted
candidates. Even when the facts in these ads are technically accurate,
they only tell one side of a controversy. Charges in negative ads are of-
ten innocuous and can be clarified or explained to voters on the basis of
differing views of policy, if the targeted candidate has an opportunity to
respond contemporaneously so that voters can judge. Moreover, when a
widely aired TV or radio ad attacks a candidate's personal character, the
attacked candidate, in simple fairness, should have an immediate oppor-
tunity to respond, before the prospect of substantial damage to reputa-
tion.
To make a contemporaneous response possible, the targeted candidate
must be able to review a tape of the negative ad and prepare any re-
sponse before the negative ad is broadcast. This will cause a brief but
not substantial delay in the initial airing of a negative ad. A short delay
to allow a contemporaneous response is consistent with current law
granting candidates "reasonable," but not absolute, access to broadcast
facilities.'4
The idea of a contemporaneous option to respond to ads is not un-
precedented or radical. The United States Senate, for example, passed a
campaign reform bill in 1991 that included this type of provision for in-
dependent ads.'" Providing a contemporaneous procedure is standard in
debate practice, in judicial proceedings, and in news coverage of contro-
13. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) (holding that fair procedure
requires opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time," before suspension of welfare
benefits); ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 2, at 43; MICHAEL PFAU & HENRY C.
KENSKI, ATTACK POLITICS: STRATEGY AND DEFENSE 70 (1990).
14. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S.
367, 396 (1981) (stating that 47 U.S.C. § 312 (a)(7) "creates a limited right to 'reasonable'
access" by federal candidates).
15. See Senate Election Ethics Act of 1991, S. 3, 102d Cong. § 202 (1991); S. REP. No.
102-37, at 56-57 (1991); 137 CONG. REC. 12,355, 12,363 (1991) (publishing S. 3 as passed by
the Senate prior to the President's veto) (providing a right of reply "immediately after" an
ad).
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versies.16 The need for a contemporaneous response procedure is no less
critical for negative campaign commercials that attack identified candi-
dates.
III. ELECTION RULES AND FIRST AMENDMENT
Legislation that places any conditions on election campaign advertising
must be consistent with First Amendment protections for political
speech. Political speech is highly protected because this type of speech is
at the core of the First Amendment.
The question of whether reasonable regulation of negative TV/radio
campaign ads is constitutional is not foreclosed by any decision of the
United States Supreme Court. Strong arguments support rules that rea-
sonably balance the rights of negative ad sponsors and targeted candi-
dates in airing election campaign advertisements on television and radio.
As a threshold matter, Congress has the underlying legislative power
to enact necessary and proper election rules "to protect the integrity of
the electoral process., 17 Some of these rules have been challenged as in-
fringing First Amendment speech or associational rights. The United
States Supreme Court has enunciated familiar standards for analyzing
these challenges. In general, the Court has invalidated electoral rules
that prevent political speech, or place severe burdens on speech,8 unless
they are narrowly tailored and serve "compelling" electoral interests.19
On the other hand, the Court has upheld certain types of regulations that
impose lesser or incidental burdens on political speech and association if
20these regulations serve important or substantial interests.
16. See Richard C. Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Li-
bel, 34 VA. L. REV. 867, 892, 895-96 & n.58 (1948) (discussing news media practices).
17. California Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981); see also Burson v. Free-
man, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13-14 n.16, 26-27 (1976) (cit-
ing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4).
18. See Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct. 636, 642 n.12
(1999) (holding that a Colorado state statute restricting initiative-petition circulators vio-
lated the First Amendment free speech guarantee); FEC v. National Conservative Politi-
cal Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985) (striking down 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f), the
$1000 spending cap for independent political committees in the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund Act, as a facially unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment free-
doms of speech and association); cf. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC,
518 U.S. 604 (1996) (construing FECA to allow political party "independent expendi-
tures").
19. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 198-99 (upholding a Tennessee state statute that prohib-
ited campaign speech within 100 feet of a polling place); Austin v. Michigan State Cham-
ber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (upholding a Michigan state statute that
banned the use of general treasury funds by corporations for state candidate elections).
20. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (fusion
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In the leading case of Buckley v. Valeo,2' the Court reviewed dollar
limitations on campaign contributions and expenditures mandated by
the Federal Election Campaign Act.23 The Buckley Court held that con-
tribution limits are restraints on association, but upheld these restraints
as serving the weighty public interest in avoiding actual or potential cor-
ruption.24 The Court invalidated the spending limits, however, because it
viewed these limits as restraints on speech and association that do not
serve the interest in avoiding corruption.25
In later cases, the Court held that a state's interest in curtailing unfair
deployment of corporate wealth that "can unfairly influence elections" is
a compelling reason to regulate these actions." In view of such "unfair
advantage,"27 the Court has sustained an outright prohibition on corpo-
rate spending for candidate elections, and elaborate regulation of cor-
29porate political action committees.
In a 1997 case involving First Amendment association rights, Timmons
v. Twin Cities Area New Party,° the Court identified the following addi-
tional electoral interests with approval: assuring "fair and honest" elec-
tions; preventing "misrepresentation"; and providing "order" and "sta-
bility" in the political system.3
Another vital electoral interest concerns the "ability of the citizenry to
candidacies); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434, 438-39 (1992) (write-in voting);
Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 972-73 (1982) (partisan political activity by judges);
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 606 (1973) (partisan political conduct by state em-
ployees); cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976) (FECA financial reporting rules).
21. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
22. See id. at 23, 35, 38-39, 51, 54.
23. 86 Stat. 3 (1971), amended by 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (current version of FECA at 2
U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1994 & Supp. III)).
24. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28-29.
25. See id. at 19, 47-48. The Court added that a $1000 cap on "independent expendi-
tures," which is spending by an outside interest group or person for electronic or print ad-
vertising promoting or opposing a candidate, is not a valid way to deal with election cam-
paign disparities. See id. at 48-49.
26. See Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1989);
see also FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986) ("Regula-
tion of corporate political activity thus has reflected concern not about use of the corpo-
rate form per se, but about the potential for unfair deployment of wealth for political pur-
poses.").
27. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 257.
28. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (state spending ban). But see Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, 479 U.S. at 263-64 (nonprofit public interest corporation).
29. See FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (public fund-
raising bar in 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1994)).
30. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
31. See id. at 358, 364-66 (1997).
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make informed choices among candidates for office."32  The Buckley
opinion noted that promoting informed choices by voters is one of the
most fundamental First Amendment activities, and is an integral part of
our democratic system of government.33
The various electoral interests cited above are not necessarily distinct.
Some of these interests are interrelated and all serve to protect the integ-
rity of the electoral process.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROPOSED RIGHT OF RESPONSE
Standards that govern the validity of electoral rules partially support
constitutionality of this proposed reform. In addition, this proposal also
draws support from separate principles concerning regulation of televi-
sion and radio mass media. This Section discusses separately these two
matters. Other matters that warrant a brief discussion include the pro-
posed definition of negative ads for purposes of response and compliance
considerations.
A. As an Electoral Reform
Strengthening the right of response to television and radio negative ads
protects the integrity of the electoral process. The two specific reforms,
shared cost and contemporaneous response, serve essential electoral in-
terests in several ways.
Sharing response time cost reduces the "unfair advantage" of excessive
spending for negative ads that, like corporate wealth, can unfairly influ-
ence elections. If the "unfair advantage" of wealth justifies prohibiting
corporations from any electioneering for or against candidates, 34 this ad-
vantage also justifies conditioning negative mass media electioneering by
other moneyed interests on partial subsidy of response time. There is no
principled basis for holding that one is constitutional and the other is not.
The contemporaneous response option serves the fundamental proce-
dural interest of targeted candidates in securing a timely and fair oppor-
32. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
33. See id.; see also Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 290 (1992) (promoting the "fos-
tering [of] an informed electorate"); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981); Red Lion
Broad. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969) (noting the "First Amendment goal of
producing an informed public").
34. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 668-69; supra text accompanying notes 26-29. Austin in-
volved a state ban on corporate electioneering. See id. at 654-55. The federal corporate
prohibition also applies to labor unions. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(9), 441b(a) (1994 & Supp. III
1998); see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (tax-exempt churches, charities, etc.). The corporate
and union prohibitions have been weakened under a controversial application of the ex-
press advocacy rule. See infra note 54.
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tunity to answer widely-aired prejudicial charges affecting that candi-
date's reputation and chance of election. Shared cost and contempora-
neous response provide a related and needed incentive for reducing out-
right "misrepresentation" of a targeted candidate's character or public
record. Finally, strengthening the right of response to negative ads in the
manner suggested promotes reasoned debate of issues raised in negative
ads, and, hence, promotes "informed choices" by voters in judging posi-
tions and qualifications of candidates.
These electoral interests are important, substantial, and compelling.
At the same time, under the proposal, negative ad sponsors may bear
significant, but not severe burdens. Disproportionate use of negative ads
would cost more and a brief delay in initial airing would occur. The pro-
posal does not purport to penalize, chill, or abridge political speech,
however, and will not in fact do so. Rather, the proposed reforms are
designed to give targeted candidates the opportunity to respond ade-
quately to negative ads, thus increasing speech and promoting First
Amendment values. Furthermore, considering the large expenditures
needed to finance mass media commercials, sharing part of the media
cost of response time appears to be well affordable by sponsors of nega-
tive mass media ads and is not, therefore, an undue burden."
The critical question is one of balance. The burdens imposed on nega-
tive ad sponsors by cost sharing and contemporaneous response are sub-
stantially outweighed by these compelling electoral interests: ameliorat-
ing unfair campaign advantage, assuring access to the public by
candidates to respond to charges, and giving voters the opportunity to
hear both sides of campaign issues. The proposed reforms are a mini-
mally restrictive means of serving these overriding interests in the integ-
rity of the electoral process as well as the First Amendment interest in
protecting debate of public issues.
35. See supra Part II.A (analyzing shared costs). In the case of opposed candidates
who use narrator-spoken negative ads and response time to the same extent, sharing re-
sponse time cost would result in a wash, and net broadcast costs would remain unchanged.
36. The proposal for cost sharing is for this reason distinguishable from cases disap-
proving compelled subsidy or display of opposed speech where no overriding public inter-
est was served. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1986) (plurality opinion) (distribution by utility of consumer group literature); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977) (display on automobiles of State motto); see also
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977) (using fees for objected, non-
germane political activities by union). But see Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S.
180 (1997) (Turner I) (carriage by cable operators of broadcast signals); Red Lion Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (free time for candidate replies to adverse TV/radio po-
litical editorials); cf. Life & Cas. Co. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566 (1934) (payment by insurer
of prevailing opponent's attorney fees).
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The proposed strengthening of the right of response is narrowly tai-
lored and covers only what is essential to serve its purpose. The proposal
covers paid TV/radio ads opposing candidates during the campaign sea-
son, but would not apply to any other campaign speech, nor to any print
medium attacking a candidate. The proposal does not apply to "issue
ads" where no target candidate is identified, nor to ads that are aired
more than three months before an election. The cost sharing provision
does not apply to ads spoken by candidates. Furthermore, the proposal
places no bar on the content of covered negative ads, nor does it impose
expenditure caps. Sponsors could continue to air those ads without sub-
stantive restrictions and only subject to a reasonable right of response.
Under the foregoing analysis, cost sharing and contemporaneous re-
sponse electoral proposals pass muster under the Court's standards for
reviewing First Amendment challenges and, thus, are constitutional.
B. As a Mass Media Regulation
Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act requires a right of "rea-
sonable access" by candidates to air their campaign advertisements on
broadcast media. In CBS, Inc. v. FCC,8 the Supreme Court held that
this access provision did not violate First Amendment rights of broad-
casters. The Court reasoned that the provision "makes a significant con-
tribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of candidates
to present, and the public to receive, information necessary for the effec-
tive operation of the democratic process."3 9 This principle also applies to
the right of response to television and radio negative ads.
The Supreme Court considered right of response issues in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.4° The Court held that FCC rules that require
broadcasters to provide free time for candidates to reply to adverse
TV/radio political editorials and for others to reply to personal attacks
do not violate First Amendment guarantees to free speech.41 The chal-
lenged rules sought to promote use of broadcast media in accordance
37. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994). But see Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678-83 (1998) (holding that a state-owned public television broad-
caster may exclude a candidate from a debate because a publicly broadcast debate was a
"nonpublic forum"); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973) (holding that broadcasters may decline to air party or non-candidate political ad-
vertising).
38. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
39. Id. at 396.
40. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
41. See id. at 386, 400-01.
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with the public interest standard of the Communications Act . The
Court held that the rules legitimately implemented that standard, and, as
applied to broadcast media were consistent with the First Amendment.43
The Supreme Court commented on the Red Lion decision in Buckley
and observed that "'broadcast media pose unique and special problems
not present in the traditional free speech case."'" Red Lion discussed
several of these problems: the licensing regime governing the medium,
public interest, rights of viewers and listeners, limited access by the pub-
lic, entry barriers, and the limited spectrum of frequencies. 4 Although
some commentators have criticized the limited spectrum rationale in
light of new technological developments such as cable and satellite tele-
vision, the Court has not departed from right of reply rules for broad-
casting approved in Red Lion.46 Moreover, the Court has distinguished
First Amendment review of public regulation of cable TV from print
media because cable TV has "control of a critical pathway of communi-
cation.
, 47
The "uniquely pervasive presence" of broadcasting48 and cable televi-
sion provides further reason for legislation of some public interest stan-
42. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 303(r), 315(a) (1994). The current federal regulations are facets
of the FCC's former fairness doctrine. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1920 (personal attack rule),
73.1930 (political editorial rule); see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386-401 (approving FCC's
fairness doctrine). The FCC recently proposed to rescind or modify these rules, but ulti-
mately decided not to. See Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n v. FCC, Nos. 98-1305,
98-1334, 1999 WL 561975 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 1999) (petition for rehearing filed Sept. 3,
1999) (remanding challenge of the FCC's decision not to rescind the personal attack and
political editorial rules for further agency explanation).
43. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 379-80, 385-86, 400-01.
44. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49-50 n.55 (1976) (citing Red Lion and quoting Co-
lumbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973)).
45. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386-92,400.
46. Cf. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 637-38 (1994) (Turner I); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376-77
n.ll, 380 (1984); Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for As-
sessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1723-32
(1997).
47. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 657; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180,
185 (1997) (Turner 1) (upholding the "must-carry" rules after finding them narrowly tai-
lored to serve important public interests, and thus valid under the First Amendment).
48. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (upholding FCC's decency stan-
dard); cf. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868-85 (distinguishing radio and television communications
from the Internet, and striking down on First Amendment grounds the "indecent trans-
mission" and "patently offensive display" provisions of the Communications Decency Act
of 1996); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 745
(1996) (discussing cable television's uniquely pervasive presence in American homes in
the context of federal statutes seeking to regulate "patently offensive" sexual material on
cable television).
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dards to deal with serious problems. The Court has emphasized, espe-
cially for political campaigns, that there is a public interest against al-
lowing those with the greatest wealth to dominate television and radio
communication. 4 These manifold factors continue to support the Court's
assessment that there is no "unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or
publish."' °
The Court's approval in Red Lion of a subsidized and thus free right of
reply as a valid broadcast regulation under the First Amendment sup-
ports a related rule for sponsors of TV/radio negative campaign ads. In
view of the pervasiveness of such ads and the unfairness that can ensue
from their use, one can make an equally strong or stronger case for im-
proving the right of response to such ads than for TV/radio political edi-
torials. Unlike newspaper or other print media," Congress has discretion
to enact an appropriate right of response reform for television and radio.
Congress can exercise that discretion in a manner that protects the elec-
toral process as well as the First Amendment rights of all participants in
mass media campaign advertising.
Strengthening the right of response to television and radio negative ads
would refine candidates' existing "reasonable access" rights to air cam-
paign ads. Reducing disparities between candidates and negative ad
sponsors is ostensibly constitutional if such a law "properly balances the
First Amendment rights of federal candidates, the public, and broadcast-
ers."52 The response remedy proposed here undertakes to reach an ap-
propriate balance.
C. Definition of Negative Ad
This proposal defines negative ads as television or radio paid adver-
tisements, aired three months or less before the election, that oppose
49. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 123
(1973) (finding that the FCC was justified in concluding that access to broadcast media
should not be based solely on "wealth"); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390, 392 (expressing con-
cern over "monopolization" of broadcasting by licensees or by "the highest bidders").
50. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 50 n.55 (quoting
Red Lion).
51. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that a
newspaper may refuse to print replies to criticism of a candidate, and that the government
may not regulate newspaper editor's choice of newspaper articles). In Commonwealth v.
Wadzinski, 422 A.2d 124 (Pa. 1980), a. divided state court invalidated a state statute with
criminal sanctions that sought to facilitate right of reply to late-breaking negative ads, in
print or broadcast.
52. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 397 (1981).
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clearly identified candidates. The operative term "oppose" also appears
in the political editorial rule that the Supreme Court sustained in the Red
13
Lion case.
Under this definition, the right of response would be triggered by cam-
paign-season paid commercials that oppose an identified candidate, for
example, by adversely referring to the candidate's character or record.
The ad does not need to include special words such as "vote against" or
"defeat." Defining negative ads in this way makes the response remedy
effective and not subject to facile evasion. This definition establishes a
clear standard, and avoids application to TV/radio ads that deal only with
issues and not with attempts to decrease electoral support for specific
candidates.
The suggested scope of the response remedy, like the political editorial




Negative ad sponsors and TV/radio managers would have to afford
targeted candidates the opportunity to respond contemporaneously to
negative ads. Responses that address the particular matters that are
charged against the targeted candidate must be aired immediately after
the negative ad. Any disputes that arise ought to be settled quickly by
informal discussion or mediation. Unjustified failure to afford the re-
sponse option could be the basis for a post-election request for declara-
tory relief and compensation for any equal time response if made. Be-
cause the subject matter is political speech, elaborate compliance
mechanisms, such as injunctive relief or criminal penalties, are inappro-
priate.
53. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 374-75 (referring to precursor of 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.1930(a)(2)); see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994) (denying tax-exempt status for
charitable organizations that participate in political campaigns "on behalf of (or in opposi-
tion to) any candidate for public office") (emphasis added).
54. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 395-96 (rejecting argument that the political editorial
reply rule is facially vague). Vagueness issues under the FECA were dealt with in Buck-
ley, 424 U.S. at 40-44, 76-80, and Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, 479 U.S. 238,248-50 (1986), by construing various FECA provisions as applicable
only to expenditures for "express advocacy" of the election or defeat of a candidate. See
also 2 U.S.C § 431(17) (defining independent expenditures as entailing "express advo-
cacy"). Under a narrow and controversial interpretation of this definition, several of
FECA's finance and disclosure rules have been evaded. See Michael D. Leffel, Note, A
More Sensible Approach to Regulating Independent Expenditures: Defending the Consti-
tutionality of the FEC's New Express Advocacy Standard, 95 MICH. L. REv. 686 (1996); see
also ELIZABETH DREW, THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 51-52 (1999).
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V. CONCLUSION
Strengthening the right of response to negative ads, through shared
cost and contemporaneous response, is a reasonable and effective way to
reduce negative campaign abuses and to protect the integrity of the elec-
toral process. Any reforms seeking to stem negative campaign abuses
will face First Amendment challenge. Without gainsaying the gravity of
the constitutional issue, the remedial measure proposed in this paper is
supportable in First Amendment law.5
As an electoral reform, strengthening the right of response to TV/radio
negative ads, through shared cost and contemporaneous response, is a
narrowly tailored rule serving substantial and compelling electoral inter-
ests that outweigh the pecuniary and time burdens imposed on sponsors.
It therefore survives stricter scrutiny than is currently employed under
the First Amendment in reviewing broadcast regulations promoting
communication of candidates' positions on issues. The particular charac-
teristics of television and radio provide added weight in supporting the
validity of this type of rule, regardless of the level of scrutiny that a court
might give the proposed reform. Therefore, the proposed rule is justified
as an electoral reform and as a mass media regulation under any consti-
tutional standard 6
Many American voters are dissatisfied with excesses of negative cam-
paigning. Mass communications campaigns bent on creating widespread
mistrust of candidates easily create mistrust of all politicians and the po-
litical process. Voters deserve an election campaign procedure that
promotes political discourse more than personal attack if they are to par-
ticipate more in the electoral process, and if they are to make reasonably
informed candidate choices. These two essential features of democracy
should be goals, not victims, of robust political campaigns.
55. For other commentary, see Albert, supra note 6; Rebecca Arbogast, Political
Campaign Advertising and the First Amendment: A Structural-Functional Analysis of Pro-
posed Reform, 23 AKRON L. REV. 209 (1990); Clay Calvert, When First Amendment Prin-
ciples Collide: Negative Political Advertising & the Demobilization of Democratic Self-
Governance, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1539 (1997); Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Federal Legisla-
tion to Elevate and Enlighten Political Debate: A Letter and Report to the 102d Congress
about Constitutional Policy, 7 J.L. & POL. 73 (1990); Timothy J. Moran, Format Restric-
tions on Televised Political Advertising: Elevating Political Debate Without Suppressing
Free Speech, 67 IND. L.J. 663 (1992); Robert M. O'Neil, Regulating Speech to Cleanse Po-
litical Campaigns, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 575 (1992); Jack Winsbro, Comment, Misrepresen-
tation in Political Advertising: The Role of Legal Sanctions, 36 EMORY L.J. 853 (1987).
56. In practice, this untried reform might be tested if some participants in political
campaigns voluntarily adopted such a procedure by modeling their brief but pertinent
presentations on traditional debate practice. For a proposed draft of legislation imple-
menting the reform described in this Article, see infra Part VI.
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VI. APPENDIX
A BILL
To amend the Federal Communications Act to strengthen the right of
response to negative campaign commercials.
Section 1. [Congressional findings and purpose.]
Section 2. The Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) is
amended by adding a new section 615, as follows:
SECTION 615. NEGATIVE ELECTION CAMPAIGN
ADVERTISEMENTS.
(a) Definitions. For purposes of this section,
(1) a "negative advertisement" means a paid advertisement spoken
on television or radio, [three] months or less prior to the election, that
opposes a clearly identified candidate;
(2) "election," "candidate," and "clearly identified" have the
meanings set forth in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as
amended, 2 U.S.C. 431;
(3) "candidate" includes candidates for state or local office of any
state enacting legislation ratifying this section;
(4) "sponsor" means any person, committee or entity paying for
the airing of a negative advertisement; and
(5) a "television or radio facility" includes broadcast stations and
networks, and cable and satellite television systems.
(b) Sponsors. A sponsor of a negative advertisement shall
(1) transmit to the opposed candidate (or to his or her authorized
representative), at least [24] hours before it is aired, a duplicate of the
advertisement and name and address of the television or radio facility
that will air it;
(2) provide the television or radio facility with a written affirmation
of the date and time the duplicate was transmitted to the candidate;
and
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(3) except in the case of an advertisement sponsored and spoken in
its entirety by a candidate about an opponent, pay [50] percent of the
media charge for airing the opposed candidate's equal-time response to
the matter raised in the negative advertisement.
(c) Television and radio facilities. A television or radio facility may
air a negative advertisement only if:
(1) it is aired at least [24] hours after a duplicate has been transmit-
ted to the opposed candidate;
(2) any equal-time response of the opposed candidate to the matter
raised in the negative advertisement is aired immediately after airing of
the negative advertisement; and
(3) subject to the exception in section 615 (b)(3), [50] percent of
the media charge for airing such response is billed to the sponsor.
(d) Remedy and non-compliance. A sponsor or candidate aggrieved
by failure to comply with this section may obtain post-election declara-
tory and compensatory relief in a court of competent jurisdiction, but
not injunctive relief.
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